Monday, January 28, 2019

Paying for alpha and getting beta (or worse)


Overall 2018 was a poor year for the performance of Australian fund managers, with some experiencing truly appalling results.

Charlie Aitkin’s Gobal High Conviction Fund lost 23.8% for the year which to me is an unforgivable performance given that the fund has the ability to go long and short and therefore should theoretically make (or at least protect) money in any environment. The Gobal High Conviction Fund now has a negative return since its inception.

In the Switzer Super Report of 27 April 2017, Charlie Aitkin wrote:

If you are going to charge active fees, which are higher than passive fees, then my view is your after fee returns have to be significantly better than what passive delivers.

I couldn’t agree more, so maybe it’s time to give up the game or return fees to investors? 

Steve Johnson’s Forager Australian Shares Fund lost 19.4% and they held (by their own admission) 25-35 percent of their portfolio in cash for the year, which makes the result truly horrendous.

The L1 Capital Long Short Fund had lost 21.9% to 30 November 2018. Very ugly indeed.

According to the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) of 24 January 2019, Caledonia Investment’s main fund lost more than 15.6 per cent, while a secondary fund which is almost entirely invested in Zillow, Grubhub and The Stars is down 27.6 per cent. 

The SMH went on to state that Zillow shares have dropped 44 per cent in the last six months, while food delivery app Grubhub is down 15 per cent and Canadian gaming outfit The Stars is down 49 per cent. 

The SMH also stated that Caledonia has 75 percent of its funds invested in the three abovementioned companies. This is sheer hubris.

Caledonia wrote to their investors stating that: 

It bears repeating that we are not macro investors and we try not to let speculation enter our thinking.

To my way of thinking, placing 75 percent of your funds in only three companies is speculating on a truly epic level and Caledonia is now seeing the end result of that.

All of these funds charge high fees and all of their investors would have performed far better had they just invested in a low cost index fund such as those offered by Vanguard or iShares (Blackrock), or alternatively picked one of the old (low cost) listed investment companies such as Argo, AFIC or Milton and gotten far superior returns while sleeping well at night.

What all of these high fee active managers seem to have lost sight of is the first rule of money management, which is to protect the money you already have. This can sometimes mean being very defensive. It can be as simple as running a well-diversified portfolio where no investment represents an excessive percentage of the fund, keeping a reasonable level of cash (when markets are at high levels as they clearly were in 2018) and putting protection in place through the use of index put options (rather than shorting which requires far more skill). All of the abovementioned funds will have failed on at least one or two of these three points.

The Australian Government’s Future Fund now has a policy of favouring index funds over active managers and they are to be applauded for that. The Future Fund very significantly outperformed the above mentioned high fee funds over 2018 and has a very sound record since its inception. This is incredibly impressive given the vast amount of money managed by the Future Fund and the fact that its employees earn far less than your average private sector fund manager.

A lot of investors who chase higher than benchmark returns are really giving up birds in the hand for birds in the bush. In addition, it’s hubris on the part of investors to believe that they can pick active fund managers who are going to outperform over time – this is truly a fool’s game. But as I’ve said before, there is no shortage of fools in this country and nothing that I write (or anyone else writes) will change that (they make more of them every day).

Footnote: One of the outstandingly positive performances from an active manager in 2018 was John Hempton’s Bronte Capital. Bronte’s Amalthea Fund returned 20.8 percent in 2018. However, since its inception, Amalthea has only outperformed its benchmark (MSCI ACWI) by 0.8 percent per annum (14.1 versus 13.3 percent), which shows that even the best of them struggle to materially outperform a passive index.

All quoted performance figures are from the fund managers’ own web sites (apart from Caledonia Investments which was sourced from the Sydney Morning Herald).